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In the absence of commitment to auditing, we study the optimal auditing
contract when collusion between an agent and an auditor is possible. We
show that the auditor can be totally useless if the auditor’s independence
can be compromised with relative ease. Even very stiff sanctions on fraud
will be unable to make auditing optimal. We then derive a demand for
independent external auditing. We endogenize collusion cost as the cost
fromtheriskoffuturedetection.Wealsoderiveajustiﬁcationforthefocus
of the recent audit reforms on penalties on CEOs in cases of audit fraud.
I. INTRODUCTION
MORE FREQUENTLY THAN WE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR, the press reports scandals
exposing non-diligent auditing. The Enron scandal is simply one in a
growing string of embarrassments for the auditing profession. The Security
and Exchange Commission (SEC) reports that the number of cases of fraud
has increased by 41% between 1998 and 2001.
1 In a recent example, which,
priortotheEnrondebacle,hadbeentoutedasthebiggestcaseofaccounting
fraud (estimated at $19 billion), the SEC investigated the ﬁrm CUC
International, the travel and transportation conglomerate that owns the
Ramada hotel and Avis car rental chains.
2 It is alleged that CUC fooled
Ernst and Young auditors for a number of years and then conspired with
them.
3 Such examples typically show that an auditor initially gave a report
of compliance for a ﬁrm, but subsequent evidence demonstrated wrong-
doing by the ﬁrm and collusion between the auditor and the ﬁrm.
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1Chartier [2002].
2New York Times [2000].
3The CUC International shareholders’ complaint states that the accounting ﬁrm concealed
thefraud,‘ﬁrstbynegligence,thenbycautiousavoidanceandeventuallybyactivefacilitation.’There is a simple solution to the problem of collusion: it is to abandon
enforcement altogether. For example, the end of Prohibition in the United
States eliminated the need for corrupt payments to the police. Put
differently, the solution to a corrupt auditor is to eliminate the raison d’eˆtre
of the auditor. Can this be an optimal response? The current theoretical
literature on collusion that followed Tirole [1986] would validate such a
solutiononlywhenauditingistoocostlyortooimprecise.
4Inthispaper,we
present a new rationale: the absence of commitment to auditing. When the
principal cannot commit to auditing and the auditor is corruptible, it may
not be optimal to audit even if auditing is costless and perfect. This new
resultstemsfromtheinteractionbetweenthecommitmentandthecollusion
problems in auditing.
The lack of commitment is a well-recognized issue for auditing. Auditing
suffers from a time consistency problem. If the ﬁrm being audited never
cheats, the audit never reveals any wrongdoing and there are no ex post
incentives to audit (Khalil [1997]). This problem could be modeled as the
auditor’s moral hazard. The auditor would not perform a thorough audit if
he knew that he could only conﬁrm the agent’s report (Baiman, Evans and
Noel [1987]). Studying the tax compliance game, Graetz, Reinganum and
Wilde [1986] were among the ﬁrst to model the IRS auditor as a strategic
actor who does not commit to an audit policy. Focusing on regulatory and
procurement relationships, Laffont and Tirole [1993] argue that either legal
prohibitions or the inability to describe future technologies may prevent
commitment. Picard [1996] explains that a commitment to audit insurance
claims in order to detect fraudulent ones is not easy to achieve, especially
when the optimal audit policy is random. In a banking framework, Khalil
and Parigi [1998] show that banks may use the loan size to overcome the





principal must also anticipate that the agent can bribe the auditor. Even if
there is a cost of writing an illegal side contract
5 – collusion costs – the
auditor may collude with the agent and submit a false report.
Todetercollusion,considerastrategythatrewardstheauditorforturning
down the bribe. This reward must be at least as high as the maximum bribe,
whichisthepenaltynetofanycollusioncosts.Ifthecollusioncostsaresmall,
this strategy is very costly for the principal, as he must give up almost the
4See for instance Proposition 1 in Kofman-Lawarre ´ e [1993]
5This is a standard assumption in the corruption literature. It reﬂects that illegal collusion
contracts are difﬁcult to enforce and therefore costly to implement. In the second part of the
paper, we endogenize this cost.
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faceshisownincentive problem, i.e.,inducing himself tohiretheauditor.In
equilibrium, the principal must induce shirking with high probability in
ordertomakeupforthecostofanauditwiththeexpectedpenalty.Butthen,
the productivity of the agent is lost (almost entirely) and the principal is
better off with the second-best contract without auditing. We show that
given any penalty, if collusion costs are sufﬁciently small, auditing is never
optimal.Thisisfairlysurprising,foraratherrobustresultfromtheliterature
is that auditing is always optimal if the penalty is high enough whether
collusion is possible or not.
6
Suppose now that the principal can also rely on another signal to deter
collusion. For example, an economic downturn exposes an unproﬁtable ﬁrm
that had nonetheless received strong marks from the auditor; the contractor
andbuildinginspector’sfraudisrevealedbythecollapseofabuildinginamild
earthquake; an unrelated audit by the IRS may expose fraudulent labor
practices. A more interesting case, considered in this paper, is when the
principalisallowedtobuysuchexternalsignal,whichwemodelasanexternal
auditor’s report. The external auditor is honest but more expensive than our
ﬁrst auditor – now called internal auditor. We show that for large enough
penalties,shirking,collusionanddetectionoccurinequilibriumasseeninpress
reportssuchastheonereportedearlierinthispaper.Wealsoﬁndthatwhenthe
principal uses an external auditor, he no longer rewards the internal auditor.
Thus,wederivecollusioncostendogenouslybyinterpretingcollusioncost
as the cost stemming from the risk of future detection. Only recently have
some authors endogenously derivedcollusion costs, but these contributions
do not rely on the threat of future detection. Using a dynamic model with
reputation, Martimort [2000] endogenously derives the cost of writing side
contracts. Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort [1999, 2002] show that
the cost of collusion between supervisor and agent depends upon the
collusion stake, the accuracy of the supervision technology and the
supervisor’s degree of risk aversion.
The recent accounting scandals have led to demands for reforms of the
auditing industry. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
7 – also known as the
corporate corruption bill – is a main component of recent reforms. There is
also a debate in the auditing profession about increasing the liability of
auditors (Grout et al. [1994]). Our contribution to the debate is to point out
thatthepenaltyontheauditorscouldbethoughtofasapenaltyoncollusion
and the penalty on the agent as a penalty on non-compliance. Since the
central incentive problem is shirking, and not collusion, increasing the
penalty on the agent is more effective in decreasing shirking and improving
6See Baron and Besanko [1984] and Kofman-Lawarre ´ e [1993].
7U.S Congress [2002].
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may provide a theoretical basis for the strong emphasis on penalties on
CEOs and CFOs in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Related Literature
Very few authors have looked at the dual problem of commitment and
collusion in auditing. An exception is Strausz [1997a]. While the model and
focus of the two papers are different, he also ﬁnds that collusion may be
optimal
8 if the principal cannot commit not to renegotiate. In his model, an
agent works on a project whose cost is known only to the agent and a
supervisor(internalauditorinourmodel),butthereisnoexplicitproductive
action. The supervisor provides a report of cost and, in addition, the
principal receives a free but imperfect signal of collusion, which can be
interpreted as the report of a free external auditor. The penalty in his model
istheshutdownoftheproject,whichiscostlyfortheprincipalandthesource
oftheproblemofcredibility.Byinducingcollusion,thesupervisor’sreportis
rendered valueless and this makes it possible for the principal to shut down
the project based only on the (external) signal while keeping the contract
renegotiation-proof.Thus,althoughitisaveryrichmodel,itdoesnotallow
him to characterize the optimal amount of shirking nor the equilibrium
without an external auditor. More importantly, when collusion occurs in
ourmodel,boththeinternalandtheexternalauditors’reportsareusedinthe
contract.Sinceinourmodel,theproblemofcredibilityisduetothefactthat
audits are costly, our focus is more on how to make audits credible and the
implications on optimal contracts. Also, with exogenous penalties, we are
able to investigate the types of penalties that are more effective.
In contrast to the traditional timing of auditing models, Lambert-
Mogiljansky [1994] introduces a monitor before the productive action takes
place. In her model, not only can the principal not commit to audit
probabilities, but he cannot even commit to the terms of the contract. Her
results also emphasize the importance of rent dissipation. However, unlike
our paper, she ﬁnds that it may be optimal to allow collusion in equilibrium
with only one internal auditor.
9
Recent papers have looked at the introduction of multiple auditors to
control collusion (Kofman and Lawarre ´ e [1993, 1996] and Laffont and
Martimort [1999]). Once again, they all assume commitment to auditing.
KofmanandLawarre ´ e[1996]andLaffontandMartimort[1999]introducea
second internal auditor. Kofman and Lawarre ´ e [1993] are closer to our
8Other papers in which collusion may be optimal, but for different reasons, are cited in this
paper.
9Note that we ignore the issue of delegation and the effect of collusion. On this topic, see
Strausz [1997b].
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that if auditing were without error, no external auditor would be hired. Our
contribution here is to derive a demand for external auditors that is
sequentially optimal even with error-free audits.
Thepaperisorganizedasfollows.InSection2wepresent thebasicmodel
of auditing without commitment. In Section 3, we introduce the possibility
of collusion and derive the optimal contract. In Section 4, we introduce an
external auditor. We conclude in Section 5.
II. THE BASIC MODEL
We present a model of adverse selection with effort and monitoring. A risk
neutral principal hires a risk neutral agent. The agent can have low
productivity y1, or high productivity y2, with y24y140. The agent puts in
non-negative effort e which, together with his productivity parameter,
determines proﬁt or output X5a(y, e), where ae40, aeeo0, a(y2,
e)4a(y1, e), and ae(y2, e)4ae(y1, e)40. The principal collects output
andpaysatransferttotheagent.Thecosttotheagentofexertinganefforte
is c(e), where ce40, and cee40. To obtain strictly positive but bounded
optimal efforts, we also assume a(y,0 ) 50, c(0)50, lime ! 0 ce(e)50,
lime ! 0 ae(y, e)5 1, lime !1ce(e)5 1 and lime !1ae(y, e)50. The
agent receives ti for producing Xi5a(yi, ei) for i51, 2. The agent’s
reservations utility is assumed to be zero. If there was full information,





i ¼ cðe 
i Þ:
We will also refer to the above as the ﬁrst-best efforts and transfers.
Under asymmetric information, the contract speciﬁes the outputs and
transfers for each state. It is common knowledge that the principal assigns the
probabilityqtotheeventthataparticularagentisoftypey1.Theagentknowsy
before he signs the contract and chooses his effort. While the output is publicly
observable, both eand yare the private information of the agent. This givesan
opportunity for the high type to shirk. Shirking means that the high type can
mimic the low type by producing the output designated for the low type, a(y1,
e1). If the high type shirks, he must put in effort eˆ1,w h e r ea(y2, eˆ1)   a(y1, e1).
Aftertheoutputisproducedandpubliclyobserved,theprincipalcanorder
anauditatacostztoﬁndoutiftheagentshirked.Therefore,weareassuming
that the principal cannot commit to auditing before the output has been
revealed
10. In this framework an audit will either reveal e or y without error.
10We assume that the principal cannot get around the commitment problem by imposing a
large penalty on himself. U.S. courts do not enforce penalties designed to spur actions.
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exogenous penalty P.
11 It can be veriﬁed that, in equilibrium, a low-type
agent does not shirk and the principal does not audit when output is high.
The principal is only concerned about a high type agent shirking. We allow
for mixed strategies: the probability that a high-type agent will shirk is
denoted by m, and the probability that the principal will audit after X1 is
produced is denoted by g. Upon observing a low output, the principal can
compute the probability that a high-type agent has shirked. We denote this
probability f, with
f ¼ð 1   qÞm=½q þð 1   qÞm :
From now on, by random shirking we mean that the high type produces X1
with probability m and X2 with probability (1-m).
We summarize the above with the timing:
1. Nature chooses y, and only the agent learns it.
2. The principal offers the agent a contract.
3. The contract is accepted if it guarantees the agent his opportunity
proﬁts (normalized to zero) in each state.
4. The agent chooses effort and output is produced.
5. The principal collects output and pays the agent the transfer.
6. The principal decides whether to audit.
Iftheprincipalcouldcommittoauditingprobabilities,thesolutiontothis
problem is well known (see e.g., Baron-Besanko [1984]). Since he cannot
commit, the contract has to give him incentive to perform the audit ex-post,
which is possible by inducing the agent to shirk in equilibrium.
12
The principal chooses the contract {e1, e2, t1, t2}. Bester and Strausz
[2001], in an insightful paper, show that with a single agent, optimal
mechanisms can always be represented by direct mechanisms even in the
absence of commitment. There is no such result available for the case of
multiple agents (Bester and Strausz [2000]). Therefore, in subsequent
sections with a strategic auditor, we derive the optimal contract among the
classofcontractswherethecardinalityofthemessagesfortheagentisequal
to the cardinality of the type space.
When writing the principal’s problem it is convenient to let the principal
choose {e1, e2, t1, t2, m, g}, but making sure that m and g are sequentially
11In this setup, the principle of maximum deterrence applies. Therefore, without an
exogenousupperbound, theﬁrst-best can beapproximated with verylargepenalties. See, e.g.,
Baron-Besanko [1984].
12A more elaborate discussion of the issues in this section can be found in Khalil [1997].
However,themainsectionsofthatpaperarepresentedusingtransferdependentpenalties.Since
ourfocushereisonthedualproblemofcommitmentandcollusion, wesimplifytheexposition
by modeling penalties as independent of the transfer. With transfer dependent penalties, we
would ﬁnd over-production by the low-type.
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Max½q þð 1   qÞm ½aðy1;e1Þ t1 þ gðfP   zÞ 
þð 1   qÞð1   mÞ½aðy2;e2Þ t2 
s.t.
ð2IR1Þ t1   cðe1Þ*0;
ð2IR2Þð 1   mÞ½t2   cðe2Þ  þ m½t1   cð^ e1Þ gP *0;
ð2ICmÞ m 2 argmaxm0ð1   m0Þ½t2   cðe2Þ  þ m0½t1   cð^ e1Þ gP ;
ð2ICgÞ g 2 argmaxg0 g0½fP   z :
The objective function is the principal’s payoff. The probability that X1
will be produced is [qþ(1 q)m], while X2 is produced with probabil-
ity (1 q)(1 m). If X1 is produced, the principal audits with probability
g, and then he collects the penalty with probability f, where the cost of an
audit is z. The constraints (2IR1) and (2IR2) are the two individual
rationality constraints. Constraint (2IR2) takes into account that the high-
type agent may shirk with probability m. The two incentive compatibility
constraints guarantee sequential rationality. The constraint (2ICm) ensures
that m maximizes the high-type agent’s payoff given the contract. The
constraint (2ICg) ensures that g is optimal for the principal after X1 is
produced.
In the remainder of this section our main objective is to establish
properties of optimal contracts that induce random audit, and show that
random audit is optimal when the penalty is high enough. However,
dependingonparametervalues,thesolutiontoproblemPNmayormaynot
involve random audit.
Proposition 0. (a) If audits are not optimal (g50), the solution to Pn is the
second-best contract, characterized as follows:
ceðe2Þ¼aeðy2;e2Þ;
ceðe1Þ¼aeðy1;e1Þ ½ ð 1   qÞ=q ½ceðe1Þ ceð^ e1Þðaeðy1;e1Þ=aeðy2;^ e1Þ ;
t1 ¼ cðe1Þ;t2 ¼ cðe2Þþcðe1Þ cð^ e1Þ;m ¼ 0;
and the principal’s payoff is strictly smaller than under full information or
ﬁrst best.
(b) Certain audit (g51) is optimal if and only if shirking occurs with
certainty (m51).
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thehightype(0omo1),butthecontractedquantitiesareefﬁcient.Thereis
no rent for either type.
(d) There exists a penalty level L, such that for P4L random audits
0ogo1 are optimal.
Proof. In appendix A.
Ifthereisnoaudit,asdescribedinpart(a),therevelationprincipleapplies
since our ‘no commitment’ assumption only pertains to auditing. The
revelation principle implies that the principal can do no better than deter
shirking. As is well known, this is best accomplished by offering the second-
best contract.
13 In the second-best contract, the high type produces
efﬁciently but receives rent and the low type under-produces and receives
no rent.
On the other hand, as described in part (b), we may have a case when the
high type shirks with certainty even though an audit is certain to follow.
Clearly this can happen only if the penalty is smaller than the rent from
shirking (gross of the penalty). Since optimal efforts and transfers are
bounded, this case cannot be optimal for high enough penalties.
Whenarandomauditisoptimal,asdescribedinpart(c),theagentwillnot
want to shirk with certainty; otherwise the principal would want to audit
with certainty and since thepenaltyis high, theagent would not shirk. Also,
unless the agent is shirking with some probability, the principal will not
audit. Thus, there must be random shirking under random auditing.
In this mixed strategy equilibrium, the principal is indifferent between
auditingandnotauditing,i.e.,givenX1thenetexpectedreturnfromanaudit
is zero. The high-type agent also is indifferent between shirking and not
shirking. Since the expected return from an audit is zero, an increase in the
probability of audit does not directly affect the principal’s payoff, but
indirectlyitreducesrentthroughthe(2ICm).Thus,theprobabilityofauditis
increased until rent is reduced to zero, and there is no rent in either state.
Sincethereisnorent,theusualrentversusefﬁciencytrade-offisnolonger
present. The probability of shirking is determined by (2ICg), where fP–
z50.Since mis afunctionofparametersalone, and thereis norent,thereis
noreasontodistorteffortsfromtheﬁrstbest.Notethat,unlikemodelswith
commitment, observed output always corresponds to the efﬁcient output
level for one state or the other.
Finally,inpart(d)ofproposition0,weshowthatrandomauditisoptimal
if the penalty is high enough. The principal’s payoff under random audit is
different from the ﬁrst-best payoff only due to shirking. As the penalty
13See for example, Laffont and Tirole [1993].
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mentioned above, certain audits cannot be optimal for high penalties.
III. CORRUPTIBLE AUDITOR
We now consider possible collusion between the auditor and the agent.
Collusion means that the auditor does not report detection of shirking
presumably in exchange for a bribe from the agent.
Theonlywaytheprincipalcanpreventtheauditorfromacceptingabribe
is to make sure that it is not proﬁtable for the auditor to do so. There are
essentially two schemes available to the principal for this purpose. The ﬁrst
scheme would threaten the auditor with a strong punishment if he were
caught accepting a bribe. However, in order to discover that bribing
occurred, the principal needs a signal or another auditor to control the ﬁrst




reward w is assumed to be non-negative.
The principal offers the contract {e1, e2, t1, t2, w}. Given the contract, the
agent decides on his strategy of shirking. Once the output is revealed, the
principal decides whether to use the auditor, and then theauditor and agent
decide upon the bribe, denoted by B.
14
We assume that each time the auditor has incriminating evidence that
would convict the agent, the agent knows it.
15 We give total bargaining
power to the auditor when the auditor and agent negotiate their side
contract.
16 Since the agent pays a penalty P when shirking is detected and
reported, the bribe will be the maximum he is willing to pay, i.e., it will be
equal to P. We want to account for collusion costs and, as in Laffont-Tirole
[1993, chapter 11], we assume that a bribe of $1 is worth only $l to the
auditor,with04l41.Thecostofcollusionmayariseduetotheriskoflegal
sanctions or due to the cost of writing and enforcing an illegal side
contract.
17 Since the collusion cost is proportional to the bribe, (1–l)
measures the cost of collusion per unit of bribe in this model.
14Kessler [2000] shows that the timing of the game matters for the relevance of collusion.
15This is direct consequence of the assumption of perfect auditing. It also simpliﬁes the
bargaining problem between the auditor and the agent. They both bargain over the amount of
the bribe under symmetric information. This assumption is, however, realistic in an auditing
framework as the agent can observe the auditor’s searching process and therefore deduce his
conclusions.
16This assumption allows us to examine the case where collusion is more costly to prevent,
which is an adequate benchmark.
17Later we discuss the cost of collusion as stemming from the future threat of detection.
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Maxf½q þð 1   qÞm ½aðy1;e1Þ t1 þ g½fðP   wÞ z g
þð 1   qÞð1   mÞ½aðy2;e2Þ t2 
s.t.
ð3IR1Þ t1   cðe1Þ*0;
ð3IR2Þð 1   mÞ½t2   cðe2Þ  þ m½t1   cð^ e1Þ gB *0;
ð3ICmÞ m 2 argmaxm0ð1   m0Þ½t2   cðe2Þ  þ m0½t1   cð^ e1Þ gB ;
ð3ICgÞ g 2 argmaxg0 g0½fðP   wÞ z :
ðCICÞ w*lB
ðBÞ B ¼ P
The incentive constraint (3ICm) for the agent and the IR constraints
remainthesameasinsection2since,insteadofthepenalty,theagentpaysP
as a bribe if shirking is detected. We argue next that collusion will be
deterred, and this is reﬂected in the new coalition incentive compatibility
constraint (CIC) in PNC. If an audit occurs, the principal now receives
(P w) if shirking is reported and nothing otherwise. If wolP, collusion
will occur and shirking will not be reported. Since an audit costs z, the
principal will only use an auditor if he can prevent collusion; otherwise an
audit is not ex-post optimal. Therefore, we have the following Lemma.
Lemma1.Ifitisoptimaltoaudit,thenitisoptimaltodetercollusion,i.e.,the
principal will set wXlP.
This result is in contrast with the result under commitment to auditing.







Comparing with our maximization problem without collusion, two new
featuresappear.First,theconstraint(CIC)ensuresthattheoptimalcontract
will deter collusion. Second, when the principal detects shirking, he now
18The principal may receive some penalty if there is error in auditing, but all parties
anticipate this and the principal has to compensate for these errors ex-ante.
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of Proposition 0 (parts a and b) which remains valid. Results similar to part
(c) also hold, but we have to account for the possibility of collusion:
Proposition 1. If random audits areoptimal, there is random shirking by the
high type, but the contracted quantities are efﬁcient. There is no rent for
either type. The threat of collusion does not affect the probability of audit,
but it increases the probability of shirking, and it lowers the principal’s
payoff.
Proof. In Appendix B.
The secondstage equilibrium differs when collusion is possible compared
towhenitisnot.Theprincipalmustpaytheextraamountwtotheauditorto
deter collusionand the ex-postreturns of detecting shirkinggoes down. The
principal is indifferent between auditing or not, and this indifference
condition is now given by
fðP   wÞ¼z;
instead of fP5z in section 2 where collusion was not possible.
Remembering that f5(1 q)m/[qþ(1 q)m], we know that there will be
more shirking (m is higher) when collusion needs to be deterred (w40).
That is, the agent shirks with a higher probability to keep the principal
indifferent between auditing and not auditing.
Note that by lowering w, the principal can induce a reduction in the
probability of shirking m. Therefore, (CIC) is binding and w5lP, which
impliesthat theprincipal’sindifference condition isnowf(1 l)P5z,and
we have
m ¼ qz=½ð1   qÞðP   lP   zÞ :
We again see that m is determined by exogenous variables, and therefore,
just as in section 2, efforts are efﬁcient when there is no shirking and there is
no rent in either state. Then, the constraint (3ICm) implies that the
probability of auditing is not affected by the possibility of collusion. The
higher m implies that the principal’s payoff is lowered.
Proposition 2: When the principal cannot commit to auditing, the threat of
collusioncanmakeauditingsub-optimaliflishighenough,evenwhenlarge
punishments are available, i.e., for any P, there exists l(P)A(0, 1) such that
0ogo1 is optimal if lol(P), while g50 is optimal if l4l(P).
Proof. In Appendix B.
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detected. Thus, the probability of shirking must increase with l to maintain
expected (collected) penalty equal to audit cost. As l increases and raises
shirking, auditing becomes less and less attractive and, at some point, the
second best contract yields ahigher payoff. Note that it is the joint action of
the lack of commitment and the possibility of collusion that implies this
result.Withoutthepossibilityofcollusion,asinsection2,highpenaltiesare
sufﬁcient to make auditing optimal. Again, we emphasize that this is a new
and fairly surprising result, for a rather robust ﬁnding from the literature is
that auditing is always optimal if the penalty is high enough whether
collusion is possible or not.
Amorestrikingfeatureoftheproblemofcollusionandno-commitmentis
best shown under the assumption of l51. Here, the principal does not
collect anything after shirking is detected. Since he will never recover the
audit cost z, the following result follows.
Corollary 1: If l51, auditing is not feasible (credible).
The problem arises because the principal has only one instrument to solve
two incentive problems. The instrument is the penalty collected from the
shirkingagent.Withthispenalty,theprincipalhastopreventtheauditorfrom
colludingandgivehimselfincentivetouseanauditor.Whenl51,theauditor
must be given the whole penalty to refuse the agent’s bribe and the principal




of collusion. Informal arguments to motivate this cost typically rely on the
risk of future detection of the collusion. In this section we take a ﬁrst step in
deriving collusion cost by explicitly modeling the possibility of future
detection. We introduce an external signal that reveals the type of the agent
and therefore reveals any shirking or collusion that may have occurred.
Suppose that the principal obtains the external signal by sending another
auditorwhowouldpolicetheﬁrstone.Wecallthisnewauditor‘external’to
contrast him with our original auditor whom we now call ‘internal’. By
assumption, the external auditor is honest, i.e., whatever bribe he is offered,
he will refuse it and report the truth to the principal. This honesty comes at
an extra cost to the principal.
20 We assume that the external auditor costs ze
(with ze4zi, the cost of the internal auditor). If the external auditor detects
19A scheme paying the auditor P when he catches the agent can only be optimal if z50.
20Using the internal auditor has a lower opportunity cost since he also fulﬁls multiple
functions in the ﬁrm, such as ﬁling taxes.
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The beneﬁt of external audits is that they allow the principal to alleviate
the problem due to lack of commitment. We will also show that collusion
occurs in equilibrium since the principal cannot commit to sending an
externalauditor.Weﬁndthatthepenaltyontheagentcanbethoughtofasa
penalty for shirking and the penalty on the internal auditor as a penalty on
collusion.Wearguethatthepenaltyontheagentisthemoreeffectivetoolas
itattackstherootproblem,whichisshirking.Thiscouldbeajustiﬁcationfor
the emphasis that recent audit-industry reforms have put on CEO penalties
in case of accounting fraud.
Inordertohighlighttheroleoftheexternalauditor,weassume thatthere
is no exogenous collusion cost. Indeed, corollary 1 then implies that the
internal auditor by himself is useless for the principal. We assume that the
principal cannotcommit tosending any auditor (internalor external).Once
outputisrealized,theinternalauditorisused withprobabilitydenotedbyg.
Theprobability that theinternal auditor and theagentcollude is given bym.
If the internal auditor gives a no-shirking report, the principal does not
know if the auditor is telling the truth or if he has been bribed. His posterior
belief about the latter event is given by
f
m  ð 1   qÞmm=½ð1   qÞmm þ q :
Theprincipal then sends theexternal auditor with probability denotedby
d. At the collusion stage, the internal auditor, having the entire bargaining
power,isabletoextractthehighestpossiblebribeBfromtheshirkingagent.
Therefore the maximum bribe, B, is such that:
B þ dPa ¼ Pa or B ¼ð 1   dÞPa;
i.e., the maximum bribe equals the expected exoneration from the
punishment.
The maximization problem can now be written as
Max ðq þð 1   qÞmÞfaðy1;e1Þ t1 þ g½f
m½ð1   mÞðPa   wÞ
þ mdðPa þ Pi   zeÞ    ð1   f
mÞdze   zi g
þð 1   qÞð1   mÞ½aðy2;e2Þ t2 
s.t.
ðEA-IR1Þ t1   cðe1Þ*0;
ðEA-IR2Þð 1   mÞ½t2   cðe2Þ  þ m½t1   cð^ e1Þ
 f gð1   mÞPa þ m½B þ dPa g*0;
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ðEA-ICmÞ m 2 argmaxm0ð1   m0Þ½t2   cðe2Þ 
þ m0½t1   cð^ e1Þ gfð1   mÞPa þ m½B þ dPa g
ðEA-ICgÞ g 2 argmaxg0g0½f
m½ð1   mÞðPa   wÞþmdðPa þ Pi   zeÞ 
 ð 1   f
mÞdze   zi 
ðEA-ICmÞ m 2 argmaxm0m0½B   dPi þð 1   m0Þw
ðEA-ICdÞ d 2 argmaxd0d
0½f





i are large enough, and zi is small enough, the
optimal contract involves random internal and external audits, random
shirking by the high type and random collusion. Again the contracted
quantities are efﬁcient. There is no rent for either type and the internal does
not receive a bonus (w50).
Proof. In Appendix C.
We ﬁnd that it is optimal to use both the internal and external auditor
underthefamiliarconditionaboutlargepunishments.Thisresultisnewand
is in contrast to what happens in a model with commitment to auditing.
Kofman and Lawarre ´ e [1993] show that in a similar setting an external
auditorwillnotbeusedifauditingisperfectandtheprincipalcancommitto
auditing. Then the only role of an external auditor is to reduce the cost of
auditing errors to the principal.
Thenew condition thatziissmallis madepreciseintheproof.Intuitively,
itensuresthattheprincipalwillnotﬁnditmoreproﬁtabletohiretheexternal
auditor alone, bypassing the internal auditor.
21
Since the reward (w) of the internal auditor is zero, we ﬁnd that the
principal prefers to punish the internal auditor when convicted of collusion
rather than rewarding him for turning down a bribe. Indeed, there are two
ways to obtain truthful revelation from the internal auditor. The principal
can pay a reward (w) that costs w5P
a; or he can use the external auditor
with probability d for a total cost of dze.I fw5P
a, collusion is deterred(i.e.,
21Note that zioze is not sufﬁcient to guarantee the use of an internal auditor since the
external auditor is honest.
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auditor is not credible. Without collusion cost, corollary 1 implies no audits
in this case. We know then that woP
a if the external auditor is to be used.
We now explain why w50 at the optimum. In the mixed strategy
equilibrium, the internal auditor is indifferent between accepting a bribe or
reportingshirkingandreceivingtherewardw.Ifwisincreased,thebribenet
of expected penalty from being detected by the external auditor must
increasetomaintaintheinternalauditor’sindifference.Thisimpliesthatthe
external auditor must be used less often (d falls), which in turn implies that
the agent will shirk more.
The driving force behind Proposition 3, which reverses the result of
corollary 1, is that the principal has the use of new instrument: the
punishment on the internal auditor, P
i. There is another notable difference
in the ﬁndings compared to section 3, where collusion cost was assumed
exogenous. Here, collusion is allowed while in Proposition 2, it is not. The
principalhastoallowcollusionifheistocrediblythreatentousetheexternal
auditor. With exogenous collusion costs, as in section 3, this second
commitment problem associated with detecting collusion is not present and
collusion can be deterred.
Wecannowreinterpretthecollusioncostintermsofpenaltiesbroughtup
by external auditing. By comparing the probabilities of shirking with and
withoutanexternalauditorweobtainaninterpretationofthecollusioncost
(1 l) in terms of audit costs and penalties,
1   l ¼
zi½ðze þ ziÞð1   qÞþqðPi þ Pa 
qðPi   zeÞzi þ Paðze þ ziÞ
:
Collusioncostscouldalsobederivedinamodelwherearandomexogenous
signal (such as a mild earthquake or an economic downturn as mentioned in
theintroduction)revealstheoccurrenceofcollusion.Iftheprincipalcanonly
rely on such an exogenous signal, collusion would be deterred in equilibrium
since there is no commitment issue with an exogenous signal.
There is a large body of literature that shows that it can be costly to raise
themaximumpenalty,orwhyinﬁnitepenaltiesarenotoptimal.
22Ourmodel
allows us to answer an interesting question: which penalty (P
i or P
a) is the
more effective instrument for the principal? What we show next is that the
marginal beneﬁt to the principal of a higher P
a is greater than the marginal
beneﬁt of a higher P
i.
Proposition 4. An increase in the penalty for the briber is more effective
in increasing welfare compared to an increase in the penalty for the bribe
receiver.
22Garoupa [1997], Shavell [2004].
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show that the probability of shirking approaches zero and the principal’s
payoff becomesarbitrarilyclosetothe ﬁrstbest whenP
a tends to inﬁnity. On
the other hand, the principal cannot achieve this result when P
i tends to
inﬁnity. The result hinges on the relative effects of the two penalties on the
probability of shirking, which is the crucial incentive problem. As P
i tends to
inﬁnity, we show that m tends to qzi/(1 q)(P
a –z i), which is identical to the
probabilityofshirkingwhencollusionisnotallowed(section2).
23Intuitively,
one can think of P
a as a punishment for shirking and bribing, while P
i is a
punishmentfor bribing only. A large P
i willreduce theprobability ofbribing
(m)arbitrarilyclosetozerobecausetheinternalauditorfearsthelargepenalty.
Our model may provide a theoretical foundation for the recent sweeping
changesintheU.S.ﬁnancialreportinglaws.In2002,theU.S.Congresspassed
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to reform the accounting industry as a response to
many accounting scandals such as the Enron/Arthur Andersen disaster. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act created an independent auditing oversight board to
monitor the auditors. However, one of the most signiﬁcant provisions of the
Act was to increase the penalties for the CEOs and CFOs who falsely certify
ﬁnancialstatementsoftheirﬁrm.Indeed,theActnowrequirestheCEOsand
CFOsofthe largestcompanies to personally approve their companyreports,
whichincludeﬁnancialstatements.Fora‘knowing’falsecertiﬁcation,ofﬁcers
nowfacepenaltiesofonemilliondollarsand/oruptotenyearsimprisonment,
and they face ﬁve million dollars and/or twenty years imprisonment for a
‘willful’ violation.Assumingthat accountingfraudoccursto hide shirking or
non-compliance and that Congress wants to maximize shareholder value by
limiting such non-compliance and fraud, our analysis suggests that Congress
was correct in emphasizing penalties on CEOs.
V. CONCLUSION
Two of the more signiﬁcant issues facing the audit industry are auditor
independence and auditor liability. Our paper sheds light on both these
issues. We model the interaction of two important problems in providing
incentivesinauditing:thelackofcommitmenttoauditingandthepossibility
ofcollusionbetweentheauditorandtheagent.Thecurrentliteraturehasby
and large ignored the simultaneous presence of these two problems, which,
we show, has signiﬁcant effects on the optimal contract.
One of our main results is the non-optimality of audits under lack of
commitment and collusion. It says that if auditor independence can be
23Making P
i inﬁnitely large is equivalent to making the external auditor free.
284 FAHAD KHALIL AND JACQUES LAWARRE ´ E
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006.compromised with relative ease, even very stiff sanctions on fraud will be
unable to make the use of auditing optimal. Our analysis suggests the
importance of increasing collusion cost to improve audit efﬁciency.
The literature has motivated collusion cost from various sources. In our
model, we endogenize collusion cost and interpret it as the risk of being
detectedbyanexternalsignal.Forexample,theBoardofDirectorscanalso
order audit by reputable external audit ﬁrms because they are not happy
with ﬁrm performance or suspect fraud. We therefore derive a demand for
external audits by reputable ﬁrms.
We show that the penalty on the agent can be thought of as a penalty for
fraud, while the penalty on the colluding auditor can be interpreted as a
penalty for collusion, and that the penalty on the agent is more effective in
increasing overall efﬁciency. This is consistent with the emphasis put on
CEO penalties in the audit-industry reforms (Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002)
following the recent accounting scandals.
Our analysis suggests that we may also expect the principal to try to
increase his commitment power. One substitute for the principal’s
commitment ability is for an industry to impose mandatory audits on itself,
which may be one explanation for the presence of mandatory audits in the
ﬁnancial world.
An attractive feature of our model is the presence of collusion in equili-
brium.
24Therefore, thepresence of collusioninequilibrium isnot necessarily a
signofinefﬁciencyofanorganization.Atechnicalcharacteristicofmodelswith
commitmentisthat,becauseoftherevelationprinciple,thesolutionexhibitsno
shirking or collusion in equilibrium. Under no commitment, the revelation
principle cannot be used, and, much as in headlines or news reports, shirking,
collusion and conviction emerge in equilibrium.
Finally, we have assumed that external auditors are honest, which can be
called into question in the light of recent events. On the other hand, the
seriousness with which restoring credibility of external audits is being
pursued indicates that our assumption may not be entirely misplaced. Thus




Proof of Proposition 0
Part (a).I fg50, the revelation principle applies and it implies that (2ICm) will induce
m50. The rest of the proof is standard, and therefore omitted.
24Che [1995], Itoh [1993] and Kofman-Lawarre ´ e [1996] are early papers where collusion
occurs in equilibrium.
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showthatg51andmo1cannotbeanequilibrium.The(2ICg)constraintimpliesthat
g40 onlyifm40.But then0omo1,and(2ICm)impliesthatthe high-type agentis
indifferent between shirking or not shirking. The principal can break this tie and
increasehispayoffdiscontinuouslybyasmallchangeinthecontractinducingtheagent
to choose m50. But then g must be zero.
(ii) m51 ) g51. If m51, f51 q. Then 2ICg implies that g51i f( 1 q)PXz,
and g50 otherwise. But by part (a), g50 ) m50, therefore m51 ) g51.
Part (c). Since g40, (2ICg) ) m40. Part b then implies mo1. Therefore, the
constraints (2ICg) and (2ICm) become indifference conditions associated with a mixed




mÞ t2   cðe2Þ¼t1   cð^ e1Þ gP;
ð2IC
0
gÞ Pð1   qÞm=½q þð 1   qÞm ¼z;
which deﬁne g and m in terms of the efforts and transfers. Replacing g in the objective
function, and g and m in the (2IR) constraints, and solving for m to obtain (2IC00
g), the
principal’s problem is denoted P0
n and is written as,
Max ðq þð 1   qÞmÞ½aðy1;e1Þ t1 þð 1   qÞð1   mÞ½aðy2;e2Þ t2 
s.t.
ð2IR1Þ t1   cðe1Þ*0;
ð2IR2Þ t2   cðe2Þ*0;
ð2IC
00
gÞ m ¼ qz=½ð1   qÞðP   zÞ :
It is clear that the constraints will be binding and production will be efﬁcient.
Part (d). First we show that g40 is optimal for P high enough. Given part (c), the
principal’s payoff under random audits differs from the ﬁrst-best payoff only by m.
However, ð2IC00
gÞ implies that limP !1m50. Therefore, it is higher than his payoff
under second best for P high enough.
We now show that g51 is not optimal for large values of P. Suppose g51. Part (b)
implies that m51. Also, (2IR2) requires that t1 c(eˆ1)–PX0. Since the rent t1 c(eˆ1)
is bounded due to our assumptions on a( ) and c( ), constraint (2ICm) is violated for
large values of P. &
APPENDIX B
Proof of Proposition 1
g40 and(3ICg)together implym40,andgo1andProposition 0(b)together imply
mo1. The constraints ð3IC0
gÞ and (3IC0
m) are the indifference conditions associated
286 FAHAD KHALIL AND JACQUES LAWARRE ´ E




mÞ t2   cðe2Þ¼t1   cð^ e1Þ gP;
ð3IC
0
gÞð P   wÞð1   qÞm=½q þð 1   qÞm ¼z;
which deﬁne g and m in terms of the efforts and transfers. Replacing g in the objective
function, and g and m in the (3IR) constraints, and solving for m to obtain (3IC00
g), the
principal’s problem is rewritten as [P0
NC]:
Max ðq þð 1   qÞmÞ½aðy1;e1Þ t1 þð 1   qÞð1   mÞ½aðy2;e2Þ t2 
s.t.
ð3IR1Þ t1   cðe1Þ*0;
ð3IR2Þ t2   cðe2Þ*0;
ð3IC
00
gÞ m ¼ qz=½ð1   qÞðP   w   zÞ ;
ðCICÞ w   lP*0:
Itisclear thatthe(3IR) constraints arebinding;otherwise thetransfers canbereduced
withoutviolatinganyconstraint.Thus,thereisnorentineitherstate.Replacingtiwith
c(ei) in the objective function, it is clear that efforts must be efﬁcient. Then, (3IC0
g)
implies that g is identical to that in Proposition 0 (c).






Proof of Proposition 2
Consider penalty levels such that 0ogo1 is strictly optimal if l50, i.e.,
Proposition 0 (d) applies. We will show that there exists l(P)A(0, 1) such that
0ogo1 is optimal if lol(P), and g50 is optimal if l4l(P).
UndertheassumptiononP,g51isneveroptimal.Wewillproceedbystepstoshow
that for small l random audits are optimal, and for high l the second-best is optimal.
i) Using f(1 l)P5z and the binding (CIC) deﬁnes a function m(l) with the
following properties:
m(l1)   1 where 0ol1o1, m(0)40, m(l) is continuous and strictly
increasing for l A [0, l1].
ii) Foroptimal efforts andtransfers, theprincipal’s payoff in problem[P0
NC]i s
continuous and strictly decreasing in m, and it approaches [a(y1, e1
 ) c(e1
 )]
as m tends to 1.
iii) WeuseProposition0toshowthatthesecondbestcontractwilldominatethe
best random audit contract if random auditing implies m close to 1. The
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 ) 
c(e1
 )] since the limiting payoff is feasible F set e15e1
 , e25eˆ1,
and t15t25c(e1
 ) F but not implemented when the second-best contract
is chosen.
The proof is completed by noting that random auditing is strictly optimal for
l50. &
APPENDIX C
Proof of Proposition 3
Step1.Randominternalandexternalaudits(0ogo1and0odo1)implyrandom
shirking and collusion (0omo1 and 0omo1).




















dÞ d ¼ð Pa   wÞ=ðPa þ PiÞ:
The case m51 and 0ogo1 is strictly dominated bythe second-best contract (g50).
To see this, use (EA-IC0
g) and m51 in the objective function, and then the principal’s
problem is to maximize {a(y1, e1) t1} subject to (EA-IR1). Clearly, the second-best




mÞ t2   cðe2Þ¼t1   cð^ e1Þ gPa:
Step 2. The optimal contract under random internal and external audits has efﬁcient
production when there is no shirking, no rent and w50.





m), the principal’s problem can be simpliﬁed as in sections 2 and 3 to show that
production is efﬁcient when there is no shirking and there is no rent. The only variable
left to be determined is w. For optimal efforts and transfers, the principal’s objective
function is
ðq þð 1   qÞmÞ½aðy1;e 
1Þ cðe 
1Þ  þ ð1   qÞð1   mÞ½aðy2;e 
2   cðe 
2Þ ;
where m is obtained by solving (EA-IC0
m), (EA-IC0
g), and (EA-IC0
d). It is clear that the
principal’spayoffdecreaseswithm.Wewillshowthatmincreaseswithw,andtherefore
w50.
First, note that (EA-IC0




ðEA   IC00
gÞ f
m½ðPa þ PiÞ mze  ð 1   f
mÞze ¼ zi=d;
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where the inequality follows from df/dm 4 0 and the previous equation. Finally,
from (EA-IC0
m) we know that d increases with w.
Step 3. Random internal and external audits are optimal.
(i) First we prove by contradiction that a contract with d51 is dominated by the
random audit contract. If d51, then m50 by (EA-ICm), but then (EA-ICd)
requires that d50 which is a contradiction.
(ii) Next we show that a contract with g51 is dominated by the random
audit contract. By (EA-ICm), g51 is not optimal if P
a is large enough since the
optimal efforts and transfers are bounded due to our assumptions on a( )
and c( ).
(iii) Next we show that a contract with g50 and 0odo1 is dominated by the
random audit contract if zi is small enough since there is more shirking in the
ﬁrst case. If g50 and 0odo1 is optimal, the optimal contract is given by
Proposition 0 but with cost of audit ze instead of zi. The probability of shirking
is then










ð1   qÞ Pa þ Pi   mze   zi
d
   ;
which shows that mom
e if zi is small enough. Since the principal’s payoff only
differs by m between the two cases, our result follows.
(iv) Now we show that a contract with d50 is dominated by the random audit
contract. Since l51, by corollary 1 there can be no audit if d50, i.e., then the
second-best contract is offered.
(v) Finally we show that the second-best contract is dominated by the random audit
contract. If either penalty tends to inﬁnity, (EA-IC0
d)i m p l i e st h a tmm tends to zero.
Since w50, (EA-IC0
m) implies that d approaches one as P
a tends to inﬁnity.
Then (EA-IC00
g)i m p l i e st h a tf
m tends to zero as P
a becomes very large, which
means m tends to zero. Therefore, the principal’s payoff approaches the ﬁrst-best
payoff. &
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qðPi   zeÞzi þ Paðze þ ziÞ
ð1   qÞðPa þ Pi   zeÞðPa   ziÞ





qð2PaðPi   zeÞzi þ PiðPi   zeÞþð PaÞ
2ðze þ ziÞ
 ð1   qÞðPa þ Pi   zeÞ





 ð1   qÞðPa þ Pi   zeÞ
2ðPa   ziÞ
2<0;






 ð1   qÞðPa þ Pi   zeÞ
2ðPa   ziÞ
2<0:
Moreover, using L’Hopital’s rule, the limit of m as P
a goes to inﬁnity is zero, while the
limit of m as P
i goes to inﬁnity is qzi/(1 q)(P
a–zi), which is identical to the probability
of shirking when collusion is not allowed (section 2).
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